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1.　Introduction
　Recent years have seen numerous problems 
related to corporate governance. Particularly, 
the number of corporate scandals that have 
arisen is remarkable, so much so that there has 
been no shortage of relevant topics to discuss 
［Saito, 2007］. These corporate scandals have 
become publicly known because of reports from 
the media and other sources. Against this back-
ground, Japanese firms are now faced with the 
question of whether it is appropriate for them 
to operate their businesses with a mentality 
from the good old days that used to be preva-
lent in Japan, while internationalization or glo-
balization progresses in the world. Corporate 
scandals are unwelcome events for firms. These 
are events that can result in a plunge in stock 
price and sales as well as a damaged corporate 
reputation in the international community, 
where countries with different political systems, 
cultures, and customs strive for coexistence and 
mutual prosperity. An important challenge with 
regard to corporate scandals is said to be how 
to explain and resolve them. This is indeed one 
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of the important issues associated with corpo-
rate governance. Considering that the occur-
rence and resolution of corporate scandals are 
common issues despite differences across coun-
tries and times, this paper explains the mecha-
nism of the occurrence of corporate scandals 
and examines measures to prevent them.
　In this paper, the intrinsic factors of organiza-
tion which scandals occur are considered from 
next 2 points. 1） this is the organizational think-
ing custom that scandals occur. This is called 
Organization Culture. This is considered by a 
study survey. 2） that is a control to possibility 
which scandals occurs. This is considered by an 
actual condition survey of Japanese small and 
medium firms.
2.　CorporateGovernanceand
CorporateScandals
　How is it caught in the organization about 
any scandals in firms, here? Further, what kind 
of purpose and theme do these scandals have 
from a relation with corporate governance? Itʼs 
considered in these points.
2.1.　ThePurposeandPointofCorporate
Governance
　Corporate governance is generally defined as 
the process of corporate management that pro-
vides a comprehensive conceptual framework 
for preventing corporate wrongdoing and 
enhancing competitiveness and profitability, 
with the aim of increasing long-term corporate 
value ［Shinkawa, 2012］. What is crucial in cor-
porate governance is the relationship between a 
firm and its stakeholders. These stakeholders 
include a wide variety of groups such as con-
sumers, employees, vendors, affiliate firms, credi-
tors, community residents, and society as a 
whole. The objectives of corporate governance 
are as follows ［Tanaka, 1998］. One objective is 
to prevent corporate scandals. Typical examples 
include fraudulent accounting. Relevant issues 
discussed include legal systems, in-house pro-
grams, and informal practices for the purpose of 
preventing unethical or inhumane actions. 
Focus is put on organizational internals. 
Another objective is to enhance profitability. 
Main considerations are economic incentives in 
connection with external factors, such as 
increases in corporate value and shareholder 
value, the influence of investorsʼ voice, and 
mergers and acquisitions. Both of these objec-
tives of corporate governance are intended to 
minimize corporate problems and inconsisten-
cies, to satisfy the demands of stakeholders, to 
efficiently pursue wealth creation, and to con-
tribute to socioeconomic progress. But, why do 
organizational scandals often occur in recent 
years? Itʼs certain that the purpose of corporate 
governance （To control scandals of a firm.） is a 
very important problem. Itʼs necessary to con-
sider this point.
2.2.　SocialImpactsofCorporate
Scandals
　When examples （the industries） are summa-
rized about the scandal in a company, it is as in 
Table 1. The organizational scandals are differ-
ent every industry from Table 1. Anyway, scan-
dals which occur in the organization are 
concealed until itʼll be reported as a problem in 
the society. More this becomes embodied from 
the next investigation.
　The whole of this example has had important 
influence socially. This paper mainly examines 
issues involving one of the objectives of corpo-
rate governance—prevention of corporate scan-
dals. The occurrence of corporate scandals is an 
important issue: it is pointed out that they 
result in breach of trust which can bring crisis 
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to firms and their employees, and that there are 
factors within organizations that could lead to 
such breach of trust ［Murakami and Yoshizaki, 
2008］.
　The Japan Institute for Social and Economic 
Affairs conducted a questionnaire survey of the 
members of its opinion-gathering program 
（SYAKAI-KOHO Network） regarding opinions 
that they have as private citizens about corpo-
rations ［Murakami and Yoshizaki, 2008］. 
According to the result, 53.5％ of the respon-
dents worry about the possibility that the orga-
nizations where they work will have a scandal. 
As for the question regarding what types of 
scandals they fear will occur, the most popular 
answer （45.4％） is employeesʼ inhumane or anti-
social actions, followed by cover-up of problems 
（37.6％）, poor products and services （32.0％）, 
and an accident or fire at factories and other 
work facilities （21.5％）. As the survey result 
shows, there is a possibility that employees 
cause scandals, and employees see that such 
scandals may be concealed. Thus, employee 
points out a concealed possibility about organi-
zational scandals.
2.3.　TwoFocusesofCorporateScandals
　Here, what kind of thing can be considered in 
order to control the occurrence of the scandal of 
an organization? The scandal of the organization 
might occur in the organization repeatedly. If it 
puts in another way, such custom will be con-
sidered as culture to be on the bottom in an 
organization. Therefore, 1st focus: Existence of 
the culture of the organization which the scan-
dal of a firm generates. And people and the 
organization of the inside and outside of a com-
pany which assert the opportunity loss to the 
scandal of a firm certainly exist. However, the 
pressure which shows resistance works to the 
acts which try to correct the scandal of an orga-
nization. By this, correction of a scandal 
becomes difficult. Therefore, 2nd focus: The 
intrinsic factors of corporate culture. This paper 
is examined from these two focuses. 
3.　FundamentalOrganizational
MechanismsThatCanLeadto
Scandals
　Itʼs necessary to pay attention to organiza-
tional thinking custom to make corporate gover-
Table 1：Corporate scandals in different industries
［Murakami, N., and Yoshizaki, S.,（2008）, p. 17, “Scandals of Japan” or Toma, M., （2014）, p. 10］
Industry Type of wrongdoing
Food Food poisoning, falsified labeling, unapproved additives
Pharmaceutical Adverse side effects
Electric machinery Bill padding
Automobile Cover-up to avoid a recall
Construction Slipshod work, collusion
Energy Criticality accident, cover-up of problems
Communications Leakage of personal information
Distribution Falsified labeling
Medical Malpractice, falsification of diagnostic records, misstatement
Trading Illegal transaction/trade/purchase
Consulting Bid-rigging
Leisure Use of industrial water as drinking water, launching of excessive fireworks
Financial Ex post loss compensation, cover-up of non-performing loans, illegal transactions
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nance function. This is Organization Culture. 
About this point, next this point is considered.
3.1.　TheoreticalApproachesforExplaining
theOccurrenceofCorporateScandals
　Why do corporate scandals occur? Why do 
firms conceal scandals? Researchers have con-
ducted various studies on factors in corporate 
scandals. A survey of the literature identifies 
some major factors, which are discussed below 
［Majima, 2008］.
　（1） Rational Choice by Individuals or the 
Organization: When disbenefits from point-
ing out a criminal act exceed benefits, indi-
viduals justify the wrongdoing.
　（2） Differential Association: Individuals often 
conduct illegal actions unhesitatingly for 
the sake of profit when they consider that 
such actions are a necessary part of their 
jobs.
　（3） An Atmosphere Fostering Irresponsibil-
ity: Organizations and their members tend 
to impose a psychological norm requiring 
blind conformity and submission, to sup-
press the voice of conscientious individuals 
who notice problems, and to eliminate those 
who raise their voice. Examples of this 
include conformity, submission, risky shift, 
and groupthink.
　Other reasons why scandals occur in organi-
zations and get covered up include anomie and 
breach of defense in depth, among others.
3.2.　ScandalsAttributedtoOrganizational
Culture
　The creation of an organization is significantly 
affected by shared values that are considered 
rational by the member of the organization or 
the organization itself. This is organizational cul-
ture. It is also affected by excessive individual 
leadership, which is typical of charismatic man-
agers, and by liberalistic values. Surrounded by 
laws and regulations, firms created under such 
conditions externalize disbenefits and judge that 
actions toward maximization of short-term stock 
price （e.g. fraudulent accounting） are rational. 
Scandals arise as a result. In other words, con-
formity to organizational culture or organiza-
t i ona l  va lues  l eads  t o  scanda l s .  Here , 
organizational culture is defined as follows 
［Toma, 2012］. The organizational culture of a 
certain group is a pattern of basic processes 
that are created, discovered, or developed by 
the group based on lessons from its response to 
issues associated with internal control and adap-
tation to external factors. It functions well, is 
deemed effective, and is infused into the minds 
of new members as a guideline for correct ways 
to recognize and consider such issues. It is diffi-
cult to identify factors that are important to 
organizational culture. Put differently, organiza-
tional culture is a product of the organizationʼs 
past experiences and consists of various ele-
ments that mutually affect one another in a 
complex manner ［Toma, 2014］. It is deeply 
related to organizational structure and pro-
cesses as well as to the awareness and behavior 
of the organizationʼs members. It is therefore 
necessary to consider reforming organizational 
culture by regarding it as a collection of various 
elements. Organizations, however, have unique 
thought processes. It is considered very unlikely 
that organizations autonomously engage in cul-
tural reform.
3.3.　ResistancetoReformingOrganizational
Culture:the“LawofInertia”
　It is quite natural that managers try to 
reform organizational culture in order to pre-
vent the occurrence of corporate scandals. If 
organizational culture is a hotbed of corporate 
scandals, the need for reforming it increases. 
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Firms, however, tend to maintain the status quo 
（homeostasis）. This organizational inertia is a 
cause of difficulties in cultural reform. Relevant 
factors are summarized as follows ［Takahashi, 
2007］.
　A first factor is a high subjective probability 
of being in a secure situation. Emphasis on effi-
ciency in the absence of awareness of potential 
crises leads to behavior stressing rational 
choice. A second factor is the “suspension func-
tion” of routines. Once corporate activities are 
become routine, there arises organizational 
resistance to changing them. The occurrence of 
such resistance depends on firmsʼ historical 
paths. A third factor is local learning, which 
refers to limits to learning which are attributed 
to organizational decisions that are path-depen-
dent to a certain extent. Learning tends to 
occur through repeated local learning. A fourth 
factor is the lock-in based on an erroneous com-
mitment. This entails the possibility of an estab-
lished practice of wrongdoing and continued 
scandals. The above four factors suggest that 
the occurrence of corporate scandals can be 
attributed to the law of inertia that is at work 
within the organization. This inertia is tied with 
the behavioral norms and thought processes of 
the organization and is part of its established 
organizational culture. Organizational culture 
has a significant impact on firmsʼ innovative 
activities and efforts to vitalize their operations. 
This is beneficial for firms. A disadvantage, 
however, is that organizational culture can 
become a hotbed of scandals. The culture of an 
organization is a result of accumulating various 
learning based on empirical rules that the orga-
nization has found. For this reason, firms cannot 
easily reform their organizational culture.
4.　TheLikelihoodofCorporate
ScandalsatJapaneseSmalland
MediumFirms:SurveyResults
　A legal system of Japanese corporate law and 
modal financial product dealings is asking a 
match of an internal control and corporate gov-
ernance to large enterprise. However, what hap-
pens to those about small and medium firms? 
This section focuses on Japanese firms, which 
have been plagued by frequent scandals in 
recent years. We conducted a questionnaire 
survey of 200 Japanese small and medium firms 
in March 2014. The questionnaire results are 
analyzed here. Do they have a tendency to let 
corporate scandals occur? This, survey result 
will be seen as a hypothesis. Based on a survey 
that we conducted to investigate the actual 
state of affairs, we examine whether corporate 
scandals are highly likely to occur at Japanese 
small and medium firms.
4.1.　FirmswithAuditorsandFirmswith
LegallyMandatedCommittees
　When the small and medium firmss Act was 
implemented in Japan, firms had to choose 
between becoming a firm with auditors or a 
firm with three legally mandated committees. 
（Reference, Figure 5） A firm with auditors is 
considered to have its root in Japanʼs traditional 
corporate system, which is based on the 
Figure 1： Firms with Auditors and Firms with Legally 
Mandated Committees
?????
???????????????????????
???????????????????
??????????
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countryʼs Commercial Code. Many Japanese 
firms are firms with auditors. A firm with the 
three committees is a relatively new type of 
company created by the Companies Act. It is 
legally mandated to set up three independent 
committees （audit, compensation, and appoint-
ment）. In each committee the majority of the 
members must be outside members. Corporate 
scandals are considered to be less likely to 
occur at firms with the three committees. The 
organizational setup of these firms promotes 
effective corporate governance. In the survey, 
the following question was asked: Is your com-
pany a firm with auditors or a firm with the 
three committees? The responses provided by 
the firms to the question are as follows: 60.5％ 
of the respondent firms are firms with auditors; 
39.5％ are firms with the three committees.
4.2.　TheImportanceofCompliance
　The survey asked a question regarding how 
firmsʼ managers and employees perceive laws 
and regulations. （Reference, Figure 1） More 
specifically, the following question was asked: 
Does your company consider compliance to be 
important? The responses provided by the 
firms to the question are as follows: 5.4％ of the 
firms consider compliance not important at all; 
6.6 ％, not so important; 18.6 ％, indifferent; 
30.5％, somewhat important; 38.9％, very impor-
tant. It is quite problematic that more than 60％ 
of the respondent firms do not consider compli-
ance very important. Judging from these 
results, corporate scandals are highly likely to 
occur, and firms are likely to lack institutional-
ized mechanisms to prevent scandals.
4.3.　SelectionofFutureSuccessors
　Another survey question was regarding the 
likelihood of continued concealment of corporate 
scandals. （Reference, Figure 2） The following 
question was asked: At your company, how are 
decisions made on selection of future successors 
（in the case of promotion）? The responses pro-
vided by the firms to the question are as fol-
lows: selection from among family members 
（21.6％ of the firms）; selection made solely by 
managers （chairman, senior advisor, president, 
etc.）（40.1 ％）; selection by direct superiors 
（6.0 ％）; selection by managers based on 
individualsʼ performance and contribution 
（26.3％）; selection based on recommendations 
from colleagues （3.0％）; other means of selec-
tion （3.0 ％）. The positive side of passing 
managersʼ opinions on to their successors is con-
tinuation of management principles and philoso-
phies. However, selection of successors from 
among family members or by managers or 
direct superiors is likely to lead to concealment 
of wrongdoings as part of organizational culture.
4.4.　CorporateGovernanceEducation
　Corporate governance education is deemed 
Figure 2：The Importance of Compliance
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Figure 3：The promotion method
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important. （Reference, Figure 3） In the survey, 
the following question was asked: Does your 
company provide corporate governance educa-
tion? The responses provided by the firms to 
the question are as follows: 19.2％ of the firms 
leave it to each individual; 12.0％ commission an 
outside organization to provide it; 37.7％ hold in-
house seminars or study groups; 16.8％ consult 
internal or external experts as needed; 0.6％ 
take other measures; 13.8％ do nothing about it. 
The fact that firms consult experts or hold in-
house seminars or study groups for the purpose 
of effective corporate governance can be 
regarded highly.
4.5.　OrganizationsThatMonitor
CorporateGovernance
　A weak system of monitoring corporate 
behavior is one reason why corporate scandals 
occur and get concealed. （Reference, Figure 4） 
The following question was asked in the survey: 
What is the main organization that monitors 
your companyʼs corporate governance prac-
tices? The responses provided by the firms to 
the question are as follows: the labor union 
（1.8％ of the firms）; a financial institution with 
which the firms conducts transactions （8.4％）; 
another firm with which the firms has an opera-
tional relationship （20.4％）; an external auditor 
（26.3％）; International Organization for Stan-
dardization （ISO） or other bodies （38.9 ％）; 
other （4.2％）. The result suggests difficulties in 
reforming organizational culture. Commissioning 
an outside organization to check corporate gov-
ernance practices is a way to avoid the potential 
negative effects of the task on personal relation-
ships and is commonly observed. Also, when 
firms try to establish effective corporate gover-
nance practices in the future, reform through 
some external system will be most important in 
the sense that people will not be involved in the 
process.
4.6.　SummaryofThisSurveyResults
　The survey of Japanese small and medium 
firms in this paper will be examined and sum-
marized. Even if it isnʼt large enterprise, 39.5％ 
of small and medium firms chooses a committee 
installation company（4.5）. This is the good 
states. As a whole, when operating corporate 
governance, there were good points: From 4.1, 
the importance of legal compliance is recognized 
（69.4％）2）. From 4.3, new knowledge is learned 
positively and specialists are consulted with 
（54.5％）3）.
　On the other hand, when operating corporate 
governance, there was a dangerous point: From 
4.2, it is the own discretion （61.7％）4） of the 
election from same family, or a manager about 
personnel promotion. From 4.5, there are many 
Figure 4：Corporate Governance Education Figure 5： Organizations That Monitor Corporate 
Governance
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companies with auditors （60.5％）5）. Moreover, it 
sees in detail. From 4.1, the importance about 
legal compliance is low （30.4％）6）. From 4.3, the 
point of having left the education of corporate 
governance to the individual （19.2％）7）.
　Japanese small and medium firms can say 
that it is comparatively good about the corre-
spondence to corporate governance. However, 
as examined by the part of 3.1 （Theoretical 
Approaches for Explaining the Occurrence of 
Corporate Scandals）, or 3.3 （Resistance to 
Reforming Organizational Culture: the “Law of 
Inertia”）, about personnel promotion, it can be 
said that the own discretion of the election from 
same family or a manager is very problems.
5.　Conclusion
　This research was considered from a paper 
survey and an actual condition survey about a 
possibility that organizational scandals occur in 
Japanese small and medium firms. When itʼs 
told from a conclusion, Japanese small and 
medium firms have been unable to eliminate 
corporate scandals. Willful wrongdoing must be 
prevented. Organizations with a strong ten-
dency toward groupthink appear strongly uni-
fied based on their organizational culture. 
Belonging to such a group, the members would 
feel at ease. However, this is where many prob-
lems arise. Japanese firms have been making 
gradual efforts to prevent corporate scandals. 
Herbert Simon once said that the environment 
surrounding people consisted of people. Monitor-
ing of corporate governance practices by ISO
（The International Organization for Standardization） 
or other bodies is also important. The less the 
need for human supervision over people, the 
less likely it is for scandals to occur or the more 
difficult it is to conceal them. This is quite 
important in the corporate world, which is 
increasingly internationalized. But few firms will 
be able to completely avoid scandal. Once a 
scandal occurs, firms should honestly announce 
it instead of concealing it before its effects 
expand. This is an issue that relates to firmsʼ 
ethical values.
　The above consideration is summarized and it 
is considered as the conclusion of this paper. 
Japanese companies cannot be reforming the 
system in an organization as adaptation to busi-
ness environment. They especially have to 
manage not only in domestic but in globaliza-
tion. Japanese firms need the innovation which 
expands not a strategic expansion but the insti-
tution and system from the viewpoint of corpo-
rate governance. As a result, there is corporate 
governance of Japanese firms developing still 
more.
　How has the Japanese company which gener-
ated the scandal in the past coped with these? 
It is thought by investigating these cases that 
new knowledge is acquired. These are future 
subjects.
【Notes】
1） This manuscript is based on a research report of ICBM
（International Conference on Business Management; Main 
Title: Corporate Governance in International Era） 
performed at Australian Bond University in August 28, 
2014.
2） 69.4％ is the total of “somewhat important” and “very 
important” in Figure 1.
3） 54.5％ is the total of “consult internal or external experts 
as needed” and “in-house seminars or study groups” on 
Figure 3.
4） 61.7 ％ is the total from “selection made solely by 
managers” and “selection from among family members” in 
Figure 2.
5） 60.5％ is “firms with auditors” in Figure 5.
6） 30.4 ％ is the total of “not important at all”, “not so 
important” and “indifferent” in Figure 1.
7） 19.2％ is “each individual” in Figure 3.
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